Post NFL Draft Analysis: The New England Patriots WRs

The 2013 NFL Draft has come and gone and the New England Patriots decided to attempt to break their trend of drafting ineffective Wide Receivers.  The original article can be found here:  The Patriot Way and Wide Receiver Evaluation

Typically a player is challenged with tougher competition, but not always.  And the utilization of a player in easier versus more challenging games provides another measurable view on a Wide Receiver.   These things bring into light three proprietary metrics, known as Competition, Reliance, and Challenge, isolated towards the player to provide a clearer picture of their on the field production and what their college coaches really thought of them.  It also helps identify system players versus players that would likely succeed outside of their system.

Using these measures along with other analytics and science, it is a good bet that the Patriots broke their string of bad WR selections when they selected WR Josh Boyce with the 102nd pick in the 2013 NFL Draft.  Boyce was an arbitrage selection, one which will pay off in the long term.  In the games measured, his competition score was just shy of the top 10% of all WRs historically in the system, and his challenge score indicates he was challenged heavily on his way to a high Wide Receiver production score.  His reliance score was neutral, showing that there were no major red flags in the production.  This combined with his physical measures profile a WR with a high likelihood for success.

The New England Patriots did take a WR earlier in the draft with the 60th pick in WR Aaron Dobson, and while he has a solid production score, it was about 10% lower than Boyce’s score and Dobson faced weaker competition and it was just as much of a challenge for Dobson.  Thus, it is a red flag for when his challenge level is raised.   Physically, he has a good skill set, but so did a few other Wide Receivers the Patriots have busted on in the past.

San Francisco 49ers: Pro Football’s Gold Standard

NFL Free Agency is a firestorm for creating football discussion.  It garners the majority of attention, while often the true mechanisms of winning go unnoticed.  One such organization that has taken steps necessary to be an elite organization is the San Francisco 49ers.

On March 1, the San Francisco 49ers announced a partnership with SAP, becoming the first NFL organization to partner with big data to improve inefficiencies in their system.  More importantly, it provides a measuring stick, and this system provides it on the fly.  Every other organization that has not embraced this system or something very similar has no chance  for success in a league built on parity and difficult financial decisions.  The longer organizations wait to embrace analytical based systems, the wider the gap will grow between have and have-nots.

The Baltimore Ravens punctuated this further by bringing home a Super Bowl trophy.   They are one of the few NFL organizations with an analytical department.  The parity environment that the NFL has setup is one that manifests a snowball effect.  For every personnel decision that is above the league average success rate, it will create winning momentum.  Success percentage over the league average provides the ability to play with house money.  Every organization that is below the league average in success percentage is handing over wins to those willing to take them.

To highlight a recent example, lets compare two personnel decisions.  One of these decisions is a great decision because it has a high probability of returning success.  The other decision has a low probability of success.

Transaction 1: The San Francisco 49ers acquire Aquan Boldin from the Baltimore Ravens for a 6th round pick and pay him $6 million.

Transaction 2: The Miami Dolphins sign Brian Hartline to a 5 year deal valued at $30.775 million, including $12.5 million guaranteed.  It is an amazing figure for a player that was the #1 WR a year ago yet only scored 1 TD.  There are four years of data to also demonstrate that the 1 was not an aberration.  It was his season total in three of four seasons.

Boldin equaled or bettered the number in 10 of his 10 seasons in the league and has scored 7 or more TDs in half of his 10  seasons.  Boldin is an investment in winning while Hartline is just an investment in a player that plays wide receiver.  As long as Miami makes personnel decisions with no fruit in winning, they will be handing over wins to organizations willing to take them, like the San Francisco 49ers.

The Patriot Way And WR Evaluation

One of the organizations I respect is the New England Patriots because they are an organization that embodies intelligence and doing things that are outside the box.  One such example was their ability to redefine how teams use multiple TEs to create on field mismatches.

One area however that the organization has struggled with over the past few years is the evaluation of WRs in the NFL rookie draft.  Lets take a look at their selections of wide receivers since 2000, the year that they selected Brady, so you can see for yourself.

 

Looking at these wide receivers, it is quite easy to understand why they have gone to free agency for wide receivers.  Chad Jackson was the highest WR taken among this group.  As a 2nd round pick, he could be characterized as a complete failure.  As a Patriot, he lasted 2 seasons and only started one game and caught 14 passes.  In one of the key metrics I use as a gauge for WR play, he rated well below the standard bar so it would be no surprise that he struggled at the NFL level.   Matt Slater has caught 1 pass, Taylor Price caught 5, Brandon Tate caught 24, and Bethel Johnson lasted long enough for 35 receptions.  With the exception of Deion Branch, the other 4 WRs taken in the 2nd and 3rd round (Jackson, Tate, Price, and Johnson), the Patriots received a return of only 79 receptions.  A 20% success rate at the position in the draft for rounds 2 and 3 would concern me as an organization.

Wide Receiver is a heavily misjudged position for a number of reasons.  The fact is that this misjudgment has created arbitrage opportunities for an organization looking to take advantage of it.  In 2011, the arbitrage WR was Cecil Shorts, and in 2012, the arbitrage WR plays for an organization where the Head Coach wanted to play Pin the Tail on the Donkey to determine which WRs to keep.  Fortunately for the Miami Dolphins, they cut the WR drafted ahead of Rishard Matthews, then cut Jabar Gaffney, and continued to increase his playing time late in the season.  He compares to two WRs taken in the early first round.

With the known information at this point, the early favorite for this year’s arbitrage WR is emerging.  He is comparing favorably to Roddy White at this early stage and is projected to go on the final day of the draft.  If your organization is looking for a Wide Receiver with that type of comparison for a discount, NFL Data Consultants is the place for you.